No. 99 C 3025United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
May 16, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ARLANDER KEYS, United States Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant Chicago Transit Authority’s (“CTA”) Motion to Dismiss Counts III and IV of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b) (6) (West 2001). For the following reasons, CTA’s Motion is denied.
DISCUSSION
CTA moves to dismiss Counts III and IV of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, which are both breach of contract claims, on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to plead that he exhausted the grievance provisions in Article 16 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between the CTA and the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 241. Furthermore, according to the CTA, Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed, as the CBA, in conformance with the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (“IPLRA”), 5 ILCS 315/1, et seq. (West 2001), provides for a final and binding grievance arbitration process, which is the exclusive remedy for Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims (which concern an interpretation of the CBA).
However, Plaintiff does, indeed, adequately plead that he exhausted the grievance procedures. In paragraphs 48 and 54 of the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states that he “properly filed for disability benefits and met all the necessary requirements for disability benefits under the Agreement.” While he does not specifically allege that he completed steps 1-4 of the grievance procedure, on a motion to dismiss, where the Court takes all well pleaded allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff (see Jackson v. E.J. Brach Corp., 176 F.3d 971, 977-78 (7th Cir. 1999), Plaintiff has satisfactorily pled that he has completed the requirements imposed on him under the Agreement (i.e. the grievance procedure steps)
Significantly, in a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff merely has to plead: (1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract; (2) performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of contract by the defendant; and (4) resulting injury to the plaintiff. Complete Business Solutions, Inc. v. Mauro, No. 01 C 0363, 2001 WL 290196, at * 4 (M.D. Ill. March 16, 2001) (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff has alleged the existence of the CBA, that disability benefits are provided to CTA employees in accordance with the CBA, that he is an employee covered by the CBA, and, importantly, that he met all of the necessary requirements for disability benefits under the CBA. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 46-47, 53-54.) Furthermore, Plaintiff has pled that the OTA had a contractual duty, pursuant to the CBA, to provide disability benefits to plaintiff, that the CTA failed to comply with that duty, and that such failure caused Plaintiff’s injury. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 49-51, 56-58.) Clearly, the CTA has ample notice of the necessary elements for a breach of contract claim. In fact, perhaps realizing the futility of pursuing its Motion to Dismiss, the CTA failed to provide a Reply to its Motion. In sum, Plaintiff has satisfactorily alleged a cause of action for breach of contract in both Counts III and IV.[1]
Finally, although the CTA argues arbitration is the exclusive remedy, Plaintiff has the right, pursuant to the IPLRA, to pursue a breach of contract action against his employer after the exhaustion of nonjudicial remedies set forth in a CBA. IPLRA, 5 ILCS 315/16; see also Bailey v. Johnsen, No. 90 C 01795, 1990 WL 115561, at * 4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 1990) (“The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act allows an individual to resort to the courts to remedy a breach of a collective bargaining agreement after the exhaustion of nonjudicial remedies.”); Cessna v. City off Danville, 693 N.E.2d 1264, 1270 (Ill.App.Ct. 1998) (finding that the plaintiff had adequately pled that she exhausted her contractual remedies under the collective bargaining agreement, and, therefore, could pursue lawsuit in court under the IPLRA). Similarly, here, because Plaintiff has alleged that he met all the necessary requirements for disability benefits under the CBA, the Court finds that he has satisfactorily pled that he exhausted his contractual remedies under the CBA, and, therefore, may proceed in court.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.