GROVES v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, (D.D.C. 2002)

Civil Action No. 01-1619 (RBW)United States District Court, D. Columbia.
December 6, 2002

ORDER
REGGIE B. WALTON, United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiffs prose complaint, filed July 25, 2001, alleging numerous civil and criminal violations purportedly committed by the Internal Revenue Service, the Indiana State Bar Association, the Allen County Indiana Bar Association; and several individuals who apparently are employed by the Allen County Circuit Court, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Ft. Wayne Division, and the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division.[1] Each of the defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint, asserting that dismissal was proper pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), (2), (3), or (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On October 21, 2002, which was approximately one year since the defendants had filed their motions to dismiss, because the plaintiff had failed to respond to the defendants’ motions to dismiss, this Court issued an Order notifying the plaintiff of the potential consequences of failing to respond to a dispositive motion, requiring him “to respond to the defendants’ motions to dismiss no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this order . . . [and advising him that if he] neither responds nor moves for an extension of time by the due date, the Court will enter a ruling based upon the motions that have already been filed.” Grovesv. IRS, Civil Action No. 01-1619, Oct. 21, 2002 Order.

This Court’s Local Civil Rule 7.1(b) states:

Within 11 days of the date of service or at such other time as the court may direct, an opposing party shall serve and file a memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the motion. If such a memorandum is not filed within the prescribed time, the court may treat the motion as conceded.

The District of Columbia Circuit has stated that “the discretion to enforce . . . [R]ule [7.1(b)] lies wholly with the district court”, FDICv. Bender, 127 F.3d 58, 67-68 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Twelve John Doesv. District of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1997)), and noted that the Circuit “ha[s] yet to find that a district court’s enforcement of this rule constituted an abuse of discretion”, id. (citations omitted). In this case, the plaintiff has not only failed to file an opposition to the defendants’ motions to dismiss, but even after this Court took pains to advise the pro se plaintiff of the consequences of such inaction see Fox v. Strickland, 837 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1988), he also failed to respond to the Court’s Order requiring a response. Therefore, because the plaintiff has failed to file a response to the defendants’ motions to dismiss his complaint, this Court will treat these motions as conceded and will dismiss this complaint.

In addition, the Court notes that on October 15, 2001, it received a motion from the plaintiff requesting that a default be entered against defendant United States District Judge William C. Lee because of his failure to timely answer the plaintiffs complaint. On October 23, 2001, Judge Lee filed a Motion to Dismiss, asserting that the plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Clerk of this Court, however, entered a Default against Judge Lee on October 30, 2001. This Court will treat Judge Lee’s Motion to Dismiss additionally as an opposition to the plaintiffs motion for a default[2]
and, pursuant to Rule 55(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, vacate the default that was entered against him. The Court deems it appropriate to do this is because, while the plaintiff has failed to properly state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Judge Lee has clearly demonstrated “good cause” to vacate the default because the claims alleged against Judge Lee are barred by the doctrine of resjudicata, as these same claims were dismissed against Judge Lee by Judge Ralph Nimmons, Jr., another named defendant in this case, in Groves v.Allen County Bar Association, Civil Action No. 3:00cv317 (M.D. Fla.). Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the default entered against defendant Judge William C. Lee shall be VACATED; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the above-captioned case be DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED