Civil Action 98-3518 Section “T” (1)United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.
June 5, 2001
Before the Court is a Motion for Rehearing, Reconsideration, Relief from Judgment, Amendment of Judgment and/or New Trial filed on behalf the plaintiff, Louise D. Chadwick (Chadwick), as well as a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Motion and for Sanctions filed on behalf of defendant, J. Edward Layrisson (Layrisson). These matters were submitted by oral argument for the Court’s consideration on May 23, 2001. The Court, having considered the arguments of counsel, the law and applicable jurisprudence, is fully advised in the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
G. THOMAS PORTEOUS, JR., U.S. District Judge.
BACKGROUND:
On June 21, 2000, the defendant, J. Edward Layrisson (“Layrisson”) filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. Submitted in support were: (1) the affidavit of Sheriff Layrisson, (2) excerpts from the plaintiffs deposition, (3) written discovery responses by plaintiff, (4) plaintiffs personnel file, and (5) a Statement of Uncontested Material Facts. The principal facts established by the statement and supporting evidence were: (a) that the plaintiff did not bring a claim before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that she was terminated as a result of her mental disability, but instead based on her having suffered a mild stroke; (b) that Sheriff Layrisson did not terminate plaintiff as a result of a disability or a perceived disability, but rather, due to the fact that she had accumulated a negative balance of 1,831 hours of sick leave and had not been fully released by her doctor to return to her job with the Sheriff’s office; (c) Sheriff Layrisson did not discriminate against plaintiff on the basis of sex; and (d) that the alleged discrimination against plaintiff based on sex occurred over ten years ago when plaintiff claims she requested and was denied a position as road deputy.
In response to defendant’s motion, plaintiff filed only a Statement of Contested Facts setting forth her version of the facts at issue on July 19, 2000. Thereafter, plaintiff moved to stay a ruling on the motion so that additional discovery could be taken. The Court granted plaintiffs request and ordered plaintiff to file a response to the defendant’s motion 15 days following the completion of discovery, set for September 18, 2000. The plaintiff however failed to file any further pleadings in this matter and the Court granted defendant’s motion as unopposed dismissing all of plaintiffs claims on November 8, 2000. It is from this judgment plaintiff seeks “rehearing, reconsideration, relief from judgment, amendment of judgment and/or new trial.”
The plaintiff filed the present motion on November 22, 2000. The defendant filed an opposition to said motion and also filed a Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s Motion and for Sanctions, requesting oral argument on December 7, 2000. On April 23, 2001, the case was re-allotted to this court and oral arguments were heard May 23, 2001.
MOTION FOR REHEARING. RECONSIDERATION. RELIEF ROM JUDGMENT. AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT AND/OR NEW TRIALI. ARGUMENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF IN SUPPORT:
The plaintiff has filed this motion Pursuant to Rule 59 and/or Rule 60
(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requesting the Court grant plaintiff’s Motion for Rehearing, Reconsideration, Relief from Judgment, Amendment of Judgment and/or New Trial based on three arguments. First, plaintiff alleges the Statement of Contested Facts submitted in opposition to defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment was sufficient to show there were genuine material facts at issue in this case, precluding a grant of summary judgment. Second, omissions and assertions contained in the defendant’s pleadings amounted to misrepresentations of the applicable law to the Court. Third, defendant did not make a submission that showed there were no genuine issues of material fact and that defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
II. ARGUMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT IN OPPOSITION:
The defendant contends plaintiff never filed a memorandum of authorities in opposition, an affidavit, or any other evidence in opposition to defendant’s motion despite an extension granted by the Court. Defendant adequately supported all arguments with case law and documentary evidence. As plaintiff failed to file any evidence in opposition to defendant’s Statement of Uncontested Material Facts, the plaintiff’s statement fails to controvert defendant’s summary of the facts. All material facts set forth by the defendant are deemed admitted for purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment.
MOTION TO DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION AND FOR SANCTIONSI. ARGUMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT IN SUPPORT:
First, defendant argues the plaintiffs motion is not timely under either Rule 59 or 60 since it was filed more than 10 days following the rendering of Judgment. The Court ruled on November 8, 2000, but the plaintiff did not file its motion until November 22, 2000. The motion fails to plead sufficient grounds for the reversal, amendment, or reconsideration of the judgment, and relief under Rule 59 or 60 is not available. There has been no mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect in this matter, nor has plaintiff demonstrated there has been an intervening change in controlling law, availability of new evidence not previously available, and need to correct manifest error of law or fact. Since the present motion is completely frivolous and unfounded, defendant requests that sanctions be imposed for the filing of said motion.
II. NO OPPOSITION SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF
LAW AND ANALYSISI. LAW ON RULES 59:
Pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court enjoys considerable discretion in granting or denying a motion for new trial. First Commonweatlh Corp. v. Hibernia Nat. Bank of New Orleans, 891 F. Supp. 290 (E.D.La. 1995), amended 896 F. Supp. 634, affirmed 85 F.3d 622. There are three grounds upon which a Court may grant a Rule 59 motion for reconsideration or to alter or amend the judgment: (1) intervening change in the controlling law has occurred, (2) evidence not previously available becomes available, or (3) it is necessary to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. Database America. Inc. v. Bellsouth Advertising Pub. Corp. 825 F. Supp. 1216 (D.N.J. 1993). Further, Rule 59 imposes any motion for a new trial shall be filed no later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.” FED. R. CIV. P. 59(b).
II. LAW ON RULE 60(B):
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the requirements for relief from a judgment or order as follows:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
In an opinion by Judge Morey Sear of this Court, he set forth the following guidelines for applying this rule:
Rule 60(b) “must be equitably and liberally applied to achieve substantial justice.” Blois v. Friday, 612 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1980). Accord, Laguna Royalty Co. v. Marsh, 350 F.2d 817, 823 (5th Cir. 1965). This rule, which allows the trial court to reopen a case, is:
most liberally applied to default judgments; its main application is to those cases in which the true merits of a case might never be considered because of technical error, or fraud or concealment by the opposing party, or the court’s inability to consider fresh evidence. (Citations omitted.) The purpose of the motion is to permit the trial judge to reconsider such matters so that he can correct obvious errors or injustices and so perhaps obviate the laborious process of appeal. Weighing against the grant of a 60(b) motion is the desirability of finality in judgments. This is particularly true where the reopening of a judgment could unfairly prejudice the opposing party. (Citation omitted). But even without such prejudice, the desirability of orderliness and predictability in the judicial process speaks for caution in the reopening of judgments. These are matters that are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling . . . will be reversed on appeal only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. (Citations omitted).
Swift Chemical Co. v. Usamex Fertilizers, 490 F. Supp. 1343, 1349-1350
(E.D.La. 1980), affirmed 646 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1981), rehearing denied 650 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Fackelman v. Bell, 564 F.2d 734, 735-36 (5th Cir. 1977)).
III. LAW ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment should be granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law,” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Stults v. Conoco. Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins. Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832
(1992)). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue/or trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex. Inc. v. M/V RISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no “genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, the Court notes that substantive law determines the materiality of facts and only “facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
IV. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS:
First, plaintiffs Motion for Rehearing, Reconsideration, Relief from Judgment, Amendment of Judgment and/or New Trial is not time barred. This court granted defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment November 8, 2000. In determining the time requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays, including Veterans Day, are not included. FED. R. CIV. R. 6(a). Plaintiff submitted the Motion on November 22, 2000, within the requisite time to file for new trial under Rule 59. However, based on the three circumstances required under Rule 59 to grant a new trial: (1) intervening change in the controlling law has occurred, (2) evidence not previously available becomes available, or (3) it is necessary to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice, the Court finds plaintiff has not proved any conditions apply that would warrant the granting of a new trial.
Second, when the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56 (c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue/or trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex. Inc. v. MN RISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). In the case at bar, defendant provided sufficient evidence, including: (I) the affidavit of Sheriff Layrisson, (2) excerpts from the plaintiff’s deposition, (3) written discovery responses by plaintiff, (4) plaintiff’s personnel file, and (5) a Statement of Uncontested Material facts. In response to this motion, plaintiff filed only a Statement of Contested Facts setting forth her version of the facts at issue on July 19, 2000. Thereafter, plaintiff moved to stay a ruling on the motion so that additional discovery could be taken. The Court granted plaintiff’s request and ordered plaintiff to file a response to the defendant’s motion 15 days following the completion of discovery, set for September 18, 2000. The plaintiff however failed to file any further pleadings in this manner and the Court granted defendant’s motion as unopposed dismissing all of plaintiff’s claims on November 8, 2000. This court finds the plaintiff did not come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Therefore, the Court finds defendant is entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law.
Third, under the law as delineated above, the Court has not been convinced of anything that warrants relief from the Judgment rendered on November 8, 2000. The Court finds plaintiff’s only basis for invoking Rule 60B(b) is the allegation that defendant sheriff misrepresented the applicable law to the court. The court finds his allegation is unwarranted. Moreover, there are no special circumstances in this case which suggest that the Court should alter its former decisions.
V. LAW ON SANCTIONS:
Rule 11(c) grants this Court the authority to impose sanctions upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties if in violation of Rule 11(b) who are responsible for the violation:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; (3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on lack of information or belief.
Defendant urges this Court to impose sanctions based on plaintiff’s unfounded motion filed under Rules 59 and 60. While this court does not find merit to plaintiffs claims and denies the relief requested, the Court does not believe that sanctions are warranted under the circumstances of the present case.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Rehearing, Reconsideration, Relief from Judgment, Amendment of Judgment and/or New Trial filed on behalf of plaintiff, Louise D. Chadwick, is hereby DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Sanctions filed on behalf of the defendant, J. Edward Layrisson, is hereby DENIED.