Civil No. 02-3590 ADM/RLEUnited States District Court, D. Minnesota.
January 23, 2004
Peter J. Nickitas, Esq., St. Paul, MN, appeared on behalf of Plaintiff
Jason M. Hiveley, Esq., Iverson Reuvers, L.L.C., Bloomington, MN, appeared on behalf of Defendants
ORDER
ANN MONTGOMERY, District Judge
Defendants Christopher Smith’s (“Smith”) and City of Proctor’s (collectively “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 29] was argued before the undersigned United States District Judge on January 22, 2004. Plaintiff Kenneth S. Benigni (“Plaintiff”) brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Smith, and claims under the Minnesota Data Practices Act (“MDPA”) and state tort law against Smith and the City of Proctor. A summary order sufficiently addresses the merits of this Motion, as Plaintiff’s claims involve straightforward legal issues. Additionally, Plaintiff abandoned many claims in the briefing and oral argument for this Motion. For the reasons explained below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed with prejudice.
During oral argument, Plaintiff asserted that he did not bring § 1983 claims against the City of
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Proctor, and conceded that his state tort claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution were barred by the statute of limitations, which in Minnesota is two years for intentional torts.See Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1); Savage v. UnitedStates, 450 F.2d 449, 451 (8th Cir. 1971); Haves v. Blue CrossBlue Shield of Minn., 21 F. Supp.2d 960, 977 (D. Minn. 1998). Therefore, the only remaining claims are Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Smith and Plaintiff’s MDPA and negligence claims against both Defendants.
Plaintiff may not proceed with his § 1983 claims against Officer Smith because the doctrine of qualified immunity protects Smith from liability. Smith did not violate Plaintiff’s clearly established statutory or Constitutional rights because he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for disorderly conduct. See Saucier v.Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Officer Smith arrested Plaintiff after receiving a 911 call during which the caller stated that Plaintiff was “causing problems” and being “Verbally abusive” to employees and customers at the Thompson Hill Rest Area. Hiveley Aff. of 1/15/04, Ex. A. The caller explained further that Plaintiff had been very abusive in the past, and asked the 911 dispatcher to send assistance. After Officer Smith arrived, Plaintiff refused to provide identification or leave the rest area after requested to do so by Smith. Based on Plaintiff’s behavior and Minn. Stat. § 609.72, which defines disorderly conduct in part as abusive or noisy behavior, Officer Smith arrested Plaintiff.See Minn. Stat. § 609.72. This undisputed evidence reveals that sufficient probable cause existed to support the arrest, and that Smith did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Additionally, even taking Plaintiff’s allegations about Smith’s behavior as true, Smith did not use excessive force during the arrest. Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Smith are dismissed with prejudice.
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Plaintiff’s MDPA claims against both Smith and the City of Proctor must also be dismissed. First, Plaintiff cannot sue Smith in his individual capacity under the MDPA. See Minn. Stat. § 13.01 Subd. 1. Second, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable MDPA claim against the City of Proctor because he does not allege that he requested data from the City or its employee Smith, or that Defendants refused to provide information in violation of the Act. See id.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s MDPA claims against both Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.
Finally, Plaintiff’s negligence claims against Smith and the City of Proctor are not actionable. Official immunity protects Smith’s decision to arrest Plaintiff because Smith’s actions were discretionary and his behavior was neither willful nor malicious. See Kelly v.City of Minneapolis, 598 N.W.2d 657, 664 (Minn. 1999); Dokmanv. County of Hennepin, 637 N.W.2d 286, 296 (Minn.Ct.App. 1997). Consequently, the City of Proctor is also immune from liability based on vicarious official immunity. See Widerholt v. City ofMinneapolis, 581 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Minn. 1998).
For the reasons stated herein and on the record, and based on all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 29] isGRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Complaint [Docket No. 1] isDISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.